


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ITEM 4

Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees—Phase "B"

Summary: In response to the approval by the Board at a previous meeting, Terms of Reference for a study on the Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees has been prepared by the PSB Staff. These terms are so general that it becomes imperative for the panel to definitely establish limits within the context of the problem from which a feasible and phased plan can be evolved. The panel should carefully formulate, as a first order of business, its concepts and outline the immediate practical limits around which a study can be built.

There are two alternatives: to require a rewrite of the Terms of Reference more specifically; or, preferably, to accept the broad statement of the problem, the objectives, and the principal tasks as outlined in the Terms of Reference, with the proviso that the panel narrow and phase the scope of its study to complete it within feasible capabilities.

Recommendation: That you approve the Terms of Reference as stated for guidance purposes for the panel, with the stipulation that the actual study must be narrowed in scope to consideration of immediate practicable U. S. capabilities.

NSC review(s) completed.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

WORKING DRAFT

Noted by DCI  
3/10/52  
Jan 10, 1952

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR PHASE "B", ESCAPEE-DEFECTOR STUDY

25X1

I. The Problem:

To prepare a national psychological strategy plan prescribing specific courses of action with respect to defectors, escapees, refugees, [REDACTED]

25X1

II. The Objectives:

A. To reduce the power of the U.S.S.R. by application of psychological and other pressures to selected population resources under its control.

B. To enhance the power of the United States and the pro-democratic world by selective acquisition, and utilization of the human resources of the Soviet orbit.

III. The Tasks:

This plan will:

A. Provide for coordinated United States Government action, establish departmental and agency roles and coordinating arrangements, and designate priorities to insure an integrated psychological program.

B. Review pertinent U.S. policy, formulate strategic guidance concerning the scope, magnitude and direction of the desired effort, review existing programs, consider new programs in furtherance of national strategic objectives, provide for fiscal support, and, where necessary, recommend new legislation.


NSC review(s) completed.

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Page 1 of 1 Page

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ITEM 5

Terms of Reference for Sub-Panel B-1  
(Inventory--Second Stage)

Summary: The Terms of Reference herein proposed concern themselves with a problem involving concrete steps to frustrate Soviet blackmail tactics. Suggested techniques are then listed for consideration. The problem is one of specific direct approach within a limited concept and with specific objectives inherent. The matter of operational techniques could more properly be undertaken by the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, who can establish working groups and maintain liaison with other Governmental agencies, such as the Federal Maritime Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, to obtain more detailed knowledge of their support capabilities for actions as outlined in the Terms of Reference and the conceivable promulgation of better actions.

Recommendation: That you favor the assignment of this task under these Terms of Reference to the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

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
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Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003200030004-4

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Security Information




27 December 1951


Amendment to Terms of Reference Ad Hoc Panel "B"

The attached terms of reference supersede sub-paragraphs 1b and 4b of Terms of Reference for Ad Hoc Panel "B", (Revised)\*, 29 August 1951.

For the Director:

  
Charles W. McCarthy  
Colonel, USA  
Executive Director

25X1

 *Two a copy of the (Revised) 29 August document.*

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27 December 1951

Terms of Reference for sub-Panel B-I

(Inventory - Second Stage)

1. Problem: To recommend concrete steps which the United States (and its Allies) can take in future to frustrate Soviet bloc blackmail tactics of the kind we faced in the siege of Berlin, the Oatis case and the imprisonment of American flyers in Hungary.
2. Objectives: The work should be concentrated on hitherto neglected means of pressure and persuasion. In this stage the Panel should concentrate on not more than ten concrete ways in which we might be able to influence Soviet conduct.
  - a. In particular, the Panel should study and make recommendations on the following possibilities:
    - (1) What can be done through United States (and Allied) control of the seas, international waterways, coaling stations, etc.?
    - (a) What can be done to hamper and delay Soviet bloc merchant shipping, fishing fleets, whalers, crews?
    - (b) What are the problems and risks of intercepting Soviet bloc shipping on the high seas?
    - (c) What justification can be found in international law, international sanitary regulations, precedents, etc., for harassment of Soviet bloc shipping and holding of ships and crews?
    - (d) What can we do which is not now being done to promote defection and disaffection in the Soviet bloc merchant marine?

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
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- 2 -

- (2) What can be done through American (and Allied) control of international air lines to hamper and delay Soviet bloc diplomats, purchasing missions, couriers, official correspondence?
  - (3) What can be done through American (and Allied) control of radio and cable communications to hamper and delay Soviet bloc official messages?
  - (4) What can be done through American (and Allied) control of international mails and customs to hamper and delay Soviet bloc official correspondence, propaganda materials, etc.?
  - (5) What measures of harassment can profitably be taken against Soviet bloc nationals within the United States (and Allied countries)?
- b. In examining these and other possibilities, the Panel should take into account Soviet bloc capabilities of retaliation.

For the Director:



Charles W. McCarthy  
Colonel, USA  
Executive Officer

Security Information

Mary Ann,

These were apparently distributed at  
a PSB meeting and no TS numbers or  
green sheets assigned.

Martha

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25X1